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Abstract
Based on data from presidential campaigns and original data from 
gubernatorial campaigns in Mexico, this paper finds that the pro-
portion of respondents who provide consistent answers to the vote 
intention questions during the same survey interview increases as 
the campaign unfolds and interest in the campaign grows. These 
voters are less likely to connect their vote choice with their po-
litical predispositions and have a disproportionate likelihood to 
change their vote choice throughout the campaign. This gives the 
impression that campaigns are more consequential than they are, 
when, in fact, vote shifts are a function of voters’ increased moti-
vation to engage in a survey interview. 
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This research analyzes why elections in new democra-
cies report a significant proportion of voters who change 
their vote choice by focusing on respondents’ survey-tak-
ing behavior during campaigns. Based on data from pres-
idential campaigns and original data from gubernatorial 
campaigns in Mexico, this paper finds that the proportion of 
respondents who provide consistent answers to the vote in-
tention questions during the same survey interview increas-
es as the campaign unfolds and as interest in the campaign 
grows. This behavior is explained because voters may be 
uninterested and unengaged in a survey interview, particu-
larly at the beginning of a campaign. This is what the sur-
vey research literature refers as “survey satisficing,” when 
respondents are not sufficiently motivated and devote little 
or no effort to generate answers quickly on the basis of little 
thinking but still offering an answer so that the survey can 
move on (Enns and Richman, 2013; Vanette and Krosnick, 
2014). These voters who satisfice also exhibit behavior that 
is significantly different from the behavior of respondents 
with consistent answers: 1) they report lower levels of inter-
est in the campaign, 2) they are less able to connect their po-
litical predispositions to vote choice, and 3) they have a dis-
proportionate likelihood of changing their vote preference.
This paper contributes to the campaigns literature by 
pointing out a different mechanism by which campaigns 
matter. Previous research has primarily focused on the ability 
of voters to base their vote choice on the fundamentals over 
the course of the campaign (Gelman and King, 1993) or vot-
ers’ susceptibility to persuasive campaign messages (Lawson 
and McCann, 2005; Greene, 2011 in comparative studies). 
The findings of this paper suggest that some voters appear 
to be respondents unmotivated to engage in the survey in-
terview. This paper also contributes to the debate of why 
new democracies, particularly in Latin America, report a 
significant proportion of voters who change their vote pref-
erence throughout the campaigns. While survey taking be-
havior can affect campaign studies in any part of the world, 
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voters may be less likely to engage in electoral surveys in 
less institutionalized party systems3 where electoral com-
petition is less stable, new parties tend to appear in each 
election cycle, and voters have weaker partisan attach-
ments (Mainwaring, 2016). In those contexts, voters may be 
less familiar with partisan options taking them more time to 
engage with the campaign events.
Survey-Taking Behavior and Campaign Effects
The conventional wisdom in American Politics has pos-
ited that campaigns have “minimal effects” since few vot-
ers change their declared candidate preference throughout 
the campaign, and forecasting models can predict aggre-
gate election outcomes well in advance of the campaign 
with few aggregate long-term variables. According to this 
literature, since party identification is strong, most voters 
are immune to persuasive campaign messages (Campbell 
et al., 1960; Zaller, 1996). Most studies find that, on aver-
age, campaigns cause less than a 5% margin shift in Ameri-
can presidential elections (Bartels, 1993: Finkel, 1993; Hol-
brook, 1996). In fact, recent research suggests that most 
vote swings are mostly a result of sample composition and 
not changes in voters’ opinions (Gelman, Goel, Rivers and 
Rothschild, 2016). According to this literature, campaigns 
play a major role enlightening voters and providing infor-
mation to support the candidate in line with their preex-
isting political predispositions –the so-called campaign 
“fundamentals” (Gelman and King, 1993; Kaplan, Park and 
Gelman, 2012, among others). 
In contrast, most studies in comparative political be-
havior, particularly in Latin America, argue that voters in 
3 A party system is institutionalized when “actors develop expectations and be-
havior based on the premise that the fundamental contours and rules of par-
ty competition and behavior will prevail into the foreseeable future” (Main-
waring, 1999: 25). In more institutionalized systems, “political actors accord 
legitimacy to parties, party systems are stable, parties have strong roots in so-
ciety, and party organizations matter” (25).
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new democracies are more persuadable and show little re-
sistance to campaign messages. Since party systems are 
young and partisan cues and roots in the electorate tend 
to be weak, campaign fundamentals (such as voters’ par-
tisan attachments) are weaker and campaigns play a more 
crucial role (Lawson and McCann, 2004; Baker, Ames and 
Renno, 2006; and Greene, 2011). For example, Greene 
(2011 and 2015) finds that in Mexico campaigns significant-
ly affect voters’ choices since 34% of the electorate shifted 
their vote intention during the 2006 and 2012 presidential 
elections.
This research presents a complementary explanation 
from what we know about campaign effects, particularly in 
Latin America, focusing on respondents’ survey-taking be-
havior. While the survey research literature points out that 
respondents not always provide carefully thought-out an-
swers about their attitudes and behavior (Krosnick, 1991), 
an interesting pattern emerges in panel surveys used in 
academic research. Most studies analyzing campaign ef-
fects rely on panel surveys (e.g. American National Elec-
tion Studies, Mexico Panel Survey, Brazilian Panel Sur-
vey, etc.), which only include one vote intention question 
in their survey instrument. Because of that it is difficult to 
test the consistency of voters’ answers and analyze how 
crystallized their vote intention is throughout the survey 
interview. However, as the literature on survey research 
warns, respondents in many cases might be distracted or 
just disinterested in the survey interview. Krosnick (1991) 
theorized this behavior in his seminal research suggesting 
that respondents may not be sufficiently motivated to pro-
vide optimal responses or high-quality data since the sur-
vey interview represents an important cognitive effort for 
little reward (Vanette and Krosnick, 2013). In terms of sur-
vey research methodology, respondents might be “satisfic-
ing” interviewers by generating answers quickly on the ba-
sis of “little thinking” but still offering an answer so that 
the survey can move on (Vanette and Krosnick, 2013). This 
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omission might be especially relevant at the beginning of a 
campaign, when the low salience of the election can deter-
mine survey respondents’ disposition to provide meaning-
ful answers. Wilson and Hodges (1992) refer to this prob-
lem as the “file drawer” model. Researchers sometimes 
treat people as if they keep their attitudes on relevant is-
sues in “mental files” that can be opened at any time and 
could provide meaningful answers at any time. Nonethe-
less, voters may suffer from a lack of attitude crystallization 
(Schuman and Presser, 1981) since they may not be moti-
vated to take the survey questions seriously. In other words, 
what the literature has highlighted as the “enlightened” ef-
fect of political campaigns, in some cases, might be a func-
tion of voters’ motivation to answer the interview. Voters 
are still enlightened by the campaign but not in the way 
the literature tends to understand the mechanism: instead 
of providing information to support the candidate in line 
with their preexisting political predispositions, political 
campaigns can increase campaign interest making voters 
more likely to take the survey questions seriously (thus, en-
gaging with the survey interview and relying on the cam-
paign fundamentals throughout the interview).
In American Politics, Enns and Richman’s (2013) study 
represents an important exception in the campaigns and 
elections literature with an indirect attempt to identify vot-
ers who satisfice in presidential elections. While pointing 
out the difficulty to directly identify respondents who satis-
fice, they rely on respondents’ self-reported care for which 
party wins the election as a proxy of survey satisficing.4 In 
particular, they find that voters who care about the election 
tend to rely more on the campaign fundamentals. Based on 
these findings, they argue that the ability to base preferenc-
es on the fundamentals does not change over the course of 
the campaign; what changes is the number of respondents 
who care about the campaign. 
4 “Do you care a good deal which party wins the 2000 presidential election?”
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My work coincides with Enns and Richman (2013) when 
arguing that some of what has been attributed to cam-
paign effects is actually a function of whether respondents 
are motivated to answer the survey interview. This study 
aims to identify which voters are satisficing without rely-
ing on proxy variables that might be correlated with vote 
intentions (e.g. partisans might care more which party wins 
the election). Moreover, in addition to testing if respondents 
who are motivated to satisfy the survey request are more 
capable of connecting “fundamentals” to vote intention, 
this study also examines if these voters are more likely to 
change their vote preference, which constitutes a direct test 
of how consequential survey satisficing is in the study of 
campaign effects. Finally, this study relies on two different 
electoral cycles and type of elections –presidential and gu-
bernatorial campaigns– in order to exclude the possibility 
that this relationship is a unique characteristic of a particu-
lar election.
The fact that some voters just do enough to satisfy the 
survey request over the course of the campaign has impor-
tant substantive implications and provides a complemen-
tary explanation from what we know about campaign ef-
fects. If respondents are providing inconsistent answers, 
their ability to connect what the literature has called cam-
paign “fundamentals” to their declared vote intention is 
lower than assumed (Enns and Richman, 2013). For exam-
ple, a respondent who is disinterested in the survey inter-
view would be unable to relate his/her retrospective as-
sessment of the national economy to vote intention, thus, 
ratifying/punishing the incumbent for a good/bad econom-
ic performance (Key, 1996; Fiorina, 1981). Similarly, a re-
spondent who just “does enough” to satisfy the survey in-
terview would be unable to connect his/her ideological or 
issue orientations to the candidate in line with his/her po-
litical predispositions. Likewise, respondents who satisfice 
would be less likely to vote for the candidate who is consis-
tent with their partisan allegiances. In this context, the first 
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hypothesis of this paper is focused on the substantive im-
plications when voters satisfice offering minimally accept-
able responses so that the survey can move on: 
H1: Respondents who satisfice are less likely 
to connect their vote choice to the campaign fun-
damentals.
Moreover, if respondents are uninterested to answer the 
survey interview, it is also plausible that what the litera-
ture considers as campaign effects is a function of voters’ 
engagement in a survey interview. A plausible interpreta-
tion of the high proportion of voters who change vote pref-
erence may be that, at the beginning of the campaign, re-
spondents are not reporting their candidate preference 
since they are not interested in the campaign. In contrast, 
by the end of the campaign, when their levels of inter-
est have increased, respondents are more likely to provide 
their vote choice. The answers provided at this later stage 
might not match their initial answer to the survey interview 
when the respondent was satisficing. In light of this discus-
sion, the second hypothesis of this paper proposes that re-
spondents who satisfice are more likely to switch their vote 
intention throughout the campaign.
H2: Respondents who satisfice at the begin-
ning of the campaign are more likely to switch 
their vote choice as the campaign unfolds.
Who Satisfices? Campaign Interest and  
Survey Inconsistency
According to the survey satisficing theory, respondents 
may satisfice in a series of ways. For example, one possi-
ble manifestation of satisficing is respondents’ tendency 
to choose the “don’t know” option in order to avoid think-
ing about the question (Krosnick, 1991; Oppenheim, 1992). 
Other examples include agreeing with statements without 
fully evaluating both sides of a question (Campbell, et al., 
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1960), non-differentiation in using rating scales (Lavrakas, 
1987), the impact of order response, particularly when re-
spondents settle for the first plausible response option they 
identify (Schuman & Presser, 1996), and the inconsisten-
cy of questionnaire responses (Achen, 1975; Converse & 
Markus, 1979; Feldman, 1989). In this paper, I focus primar-
ily on respondents’ lack of consistency in the course of a 
single survey interview, particularly in regards to the vote 
choice survey question.
To identify survey satisficing, this research avoids what 
the survey research literature has defined as the “automatic 
activation” problem (Weisberg, 1996; Wilson and Hodges, 
1992) in which it is assumed that survey questions auto-
matically activate a relevant attitude –in this case, vote in-
tention. In contrast, I assume that there is no perfect way to 
measure a concept or behavior. Because no single question 
is able to fully capture them, it is necessary to rely on mul-
tiple questions that attempt to get at these concepts. By in-
cluding more than one vote intention questions throughout 
a single interview it is possible to discern the crystallization 
and consistency of respondents’ declared vote intention.5
In particular, this study relies on two vote intention sur-
vey questions that are inquired over the course of a single 
interview. The first question inquires which candidate the 
respondent would vote for. In this particular case, the in-
terviewer does not explicitly mention which the candidates 
and parties are:67
Who would you prefer to be the next president of the 
Republic? 
5 To measure vote intention, I do not include questions with the exact same 
wording throughout the questionnaire since voters may be reluctant to con-
tinue the survey interview if they perceive that exactly the same question is 
asked several times (respondents would feel tested by the survey interview). 
To avoid this perception, I base my analysis on vote choice questions with al-
ternative wordings and structure.
6 The complete list of wordings appears in Table A1 of the Appendix.
7 In this question, respondents can either declare partisan preference or candi-
date preference.
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The second question is the vote intention survey ques-
tion commonly used by electoral polls and panel surveys.8 
In this case, respondents will receive a ballot in which they 
can see the name and party logos, and respondents choose 
accordingly. It is worth mentioning that both questions 
were included in the first part of the questionnaire before 
the survey instrument contaminates the respondent’s an-
swers to the vote intention questions:9
Elections to elect the President of the Republic will be 
held in July. Which party or candidate would you vote for if 
elections were held today?
In order to detect survey satisficing, this study identi-
fies those voters who provide inconsistent answers to the 
vote intention questions. I consider that respondents satis-
fice when any of the following three conditions are met: 1) 
when a respondent declares support for candidate A in the 
first question, but supports candidate B in the second ques-
tion; 2) when some respondent answers that s/he will vote 
for “none” of the candidates in one question but declares a 
candidate preference in the second question; and 3) when 
some respondent answers “don’t know” in the first question 
but declares a candidate preference in the second one.
Figure1displays the percentage of survey inconsisten-
cy in the 2006 and 2012 presidential elections in Mexico 
based on data from 14 face-to-face national surveys con-
8 If the interview is face-to-face respondents will receive a ballot in which they 
can see the name and party logos. The respondent will choose the party and 
candidate whom s/he will vote for. If the interview is administered by tele-
phone, the interviewer will mention explicitly the candidates and parties they 
are running with. 
9 Although it is plausible that the location of the two vote choice questions could 
have affected voters’ responses (e.g. activated respondents’ vote choice) it is 
worth noting that in 2012, when voters’ inconsistency registered the lowest 
level, the two vote choice questions were inquired one after the other one. 
In contrast, when some questions were located between the two vote choice 
questions (e.g. voters’ political information and candidate evaluations), and it 
is expected to decrease survey satisficing, the proportion of voters with incon-
sistent answers was higher (2006 and 2015). In other words, the location of 
the two vote choice questions does not seem to affect respondents’ survey-
taking behavior.
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ducted between the beginning and the end of each cam-
paign. As expected, there was a decline in the number of 
respondents who provided inconsistent answers to the vote 
intention survey questions as the campaigns progressed. At 
the beginning, when the election was not salient yet and 
voters had not been exposed to high levels of campaign in-
formation, a sizable portion of the electorate satisficed (26 
and 18 percent, respectively.) As election day approached, 
the proportion of respondents who satisfice decreased to 18 
and 8 percent, respectively.1011
Figure 1.  
Survey Inconsistency in Presidential Campaigns in Mexico
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10 An additional third group provided “don’t know” responses to both vote choice 
questions (an average 10% over the course of the 2006 and 2012 presidential 
campaigns). I exclude this category from subsequent analysis since this pa-
per primarily focuses on respondents that declare a candidate preference in at 
least one of the vote choice survey questions. 
11 Survey satisficing was stronger during the 2006 presidential election. Two el-
ements might have affected survey-taking behavior during the 2012 presiden-
tial election. First, one of the major presidential candidates ran again in the 
2012 (e.g. leftist candidate Andrés Manuel López Obrador), which might have 
helped voters achieving crystallized preferences in earlier stages of the cam-
paign. And second, the 2012 campaign was shorter than the 2006 presidential 
election, which might have encouraged voters to pay attention to campaign 
events at earlier stages. While the 2006 campaign began in January and last-
ed 6 months, the 2012 campaign began in April and lasted three months.
 Days until Election Day Days until Election Day
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Table 1 displays the results from logistic regressions 
based on pooled electoral data collected during the 2012 
presidential campaigns and confirm that survey inconsis-
tency decreases as the campaign unfolds even when con-
trolled by additional variables (e.g. partisanship, campaign 
interest,12 and socioeconomic variables): the higher number 
of days until election day (natural log), voters are more like-
ly to declare inconsistent vote intention (p < .01.) This trend 
is consistent with the literature on survey research meth-
odology that has found that the number of respondents 
who satisfice tends to decrease as election day approaches 
(Banducci and Stevens, 2015).13 Likewise, in addition to the 
proximity to the election, non-partisans, voters who report 
less interest in the campaign, and voters with lower levels 
of education are more likely to report inconsistent prefer-
ences. These results are also consistent with the survey re-
search literature, which finds that survey satisficing is more 
prevalent among less-sophisticated respondents (Krosnick, 
1987).
Table 1.  
Respondents Who are More Likely to Satisfice
Logistic Regression Models
DV: 1 Satisficing 0: Consistent 
2012
(1) (2) (3)
INTEREST in Campaign -0.38*** -0.95*** -0.75***
(0.03) (0.15) (0.16)
DAYS Until Election day (ln) -0.16 -0.11
(0.13) (0.14)
12 Campaign Interest: “How much attention are you paying to the electoral cam-
paign: very much, some, not much, not at all?” This survey question was only 
included in the 2012 electoral polls.
13 Banducci and Stevens (2015) test respondents’ propensity to give consistent 
answers across a range of questions: trust in five different institutions –from 
the police to the United Nations– and assessments of trust, fairness, and help-
fulness of people.
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Interest X DAYS (ln) 0.15*** 0.11***
(0.04) (0.04)
Partisans -1.31***
(0.34)
Partisans X DAYS (ln) 0.11
(0.08)
Education -0.08**
(0.04)
Age -0.00
(0.00)
Female -0.02
(0.07)
Constant -0.55*** 0.06 0.47
(0.11) (0.56) (0.59)
Observations 9,131 9,131 9,116
Pseudo R-sq 0.02 0.04 0.06
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1. The table displays results from logit models. The dependent 
variable is a dichotomous measure that takes on the value of 1 if 
the respondent satisfices and 0 if provides consistent answers.  
Source: Pooled data from the 2012 presidential electoral polls.
These models also allow identifying that campaign interest 
appears to be the mechanism that affects voters’ likelihood 
of satisficing, and this effect is conditional on the proxim-
ity of the election (INTEREST X DAYS (ln)): as election day 
approaches, the proportion of voters who report consistent 
answers to the vote intention questions increases(p < .01, 
Figure 2). Moreover, we also know, based on the data from 
the 2012 presidential campaign, that the proportion of vot-
ers who report low levels of interest decreases throughout 
the campaigns (from 20 percent to 11 percent), which also 
contributes to decrease the proportion of survey inconsis-
tency. It is worth noting that partisanship has an effect on 
the likelihood of satisficing but it is not conditional on prox-
imity to the election; the effect of partisanship remains con-
stant throughout the campaign (the interaction is not statis-
tically significant). The models do not include data from the 
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2006 presidential election since campaign interest was not 
consistently included in the questionnaires.
Figure 2.  
Campaign Interest and Survey Satisficing (Mexico 2012)
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To be sure that survey inconsistency is, in fact, a proxy of sur-
vey satisficing, this study also tests the association between 
survey inconsistency and “don’t know” answers. DK answers 
constitute another measure commonly used by the survey 
research methodology literature to test survey satisficing: 
the number of times the respondent answers “don’t know” 
throughout the survey interview captures respondents’ lev-
el of engagement with the interview (the higher number of 
don’t knows, the lower the level of engagement). Figure 3 
shows that the number of “don’t knows” is a strong pre-
dictor of respondents’ inconsistency to the vote intention 
question (Table A2 in the Appendix reports the complete lo-
gistic models). For example, in 2006, if a respondent replied 
“don’t know” 15 times or more during the same interview 
(of 43 questions per interview, on average), that respon-
dent was very likely to provide inconsistent answers to the 
vote intention questions. In 2012, if a respondent replied 
“don’t know” 10 times or more during the same interview 
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(of 30 questions per interview, on average), that respon-
dent was very likely to provide inconsistent answers. In 
other words, providing a disproportionate large proportion 
of “don’t know” answers is highly predictive of survey in-
consistency. Tables A3-A4 of the Appendix replicate the re-
sults reported in this paper using a latent variable that cap-
tures both measures of satisficing. The results do not differ 
substantially.14
Figure 3.  
Survey Consistency and “Don’t Know” Answers
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An alternative explanation of the results of this section re-
lates to the wording of the two vote intention survey ques-
tions. The first question asks whom the respondent “would 
like” to have as president, which can be a proxy for ex-
pressive voting since it inquires a broad preference (“Who 
would you prefer”). In contrast, the second question explic-
itly narrows the focus of the answer to vote choice (“Which 
party or candidate would you vote for if elections were 
14 I also analyzed the length of the survey interview (minutes) when the informa-
tion was available. The length of the survey interview was not associated with 
the number of don’t knows (p=-0.03,p=-0.06) or with vote choice consistency 
(p=-0.01, p=-0.03).
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held today?). To be sure that question wording is not driv-
ing the different answers, this study conducted an origi-
nal telephone survey during the 2015 gubernatorial elec-
tion in Mexico (two Mexican states: Michoacán and Nuevo 
León). Both studies included two vote intention questions 
in the same interview. The first one reads as follows, which 
avoids an expressive voting interpretation of the question:
“On June 7th elections to choose governor of 
the State will be held. If elections were held to-
day, which candidate or political party would 
you vote for? (VOLUNTARY)”
The second question relies on the following question.
“Between the following candidates for gov-
ernor: Candidate A of the Party A, Candidate B 
of the Party B and Candidate C of the Party C… 
Which candidate would you vote for?
As Figure 4 shows, survey satisficing is not driven by ques-
tion wording and is not a phenomenon limited to presiden-
tial elections or specific electoral cycles. Figure 4 presents 
the estimates of respondents who satisfice in gubernato-
rial elections in Mexico based on an original panel survey 
conducted in two Mexican States during the 2015 elector-
al cycle: Michoacán and Nuevo León. It is worth mention-
ing that the percent of survey satisficing at the beginning 
of the campaigns is significantly higher than its counterpart 
in presidential elections (42% and 35%, respectively). This 
might be the result of gubernatorial elections being less sa-
lient than presidential elections and/or offering a less in-
tensive information environment compared to presidential 
elections. As in the case of presidential elections, the pro-
portion of survey satisficing decreases in both states (25%). 
When testing the hypotheses of this paper I consider 
alternative explanations. First, it is plausible that satisfic-
ing could be a function of partisanship –the most important 
predictor of vote intention stability at the individual level 
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according to the literature on voting behavior. Following 
this logic, partisan voters would be more inclined to pro-
vide consistent answers, while independents –due to their 
lack of attachment to parties– would be “shopping” and de-
claring inconsistent candidate preferences during the sur-
vey interview. Second, the analysis also considers politi-
cal information, particularly candidates’ name recognition, 
as an alternative hypothesis. It is plausible that voters who 
provide inconsistent answers to the vote intention question 
are driven by lack of information. For example, if voters do 
not know the name of the major candidates competing in 
the election, it is possible that they will not display a candi-
date preference in the first question, but once they hear the 
name of the candidates during the survey interview, they 
will be able to declare their vote intention in the second 
question. In this scenario, the variable driving voters’ in-
consistency is not disinterest in taking the survey interview 
but their lack of information.
Figure 4.  
Survey Inconsistency in Gubernatorial Campaigns in Mexico  
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Third, this study also considers that satisficing might be a 
function of the strength of respondents’ declared vote in-
tention, particularly at the beginning of the campaign. In 
this scenario, this apparent uncertainty would explain why 
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respondents prefer one candidate in some moments of the 
questionnaire, only to prefer another candidate in other 
parts of the questionnaire. The next sections will present a 
brief overview of the Mexican Party System as well as the 
empirical strategy employed to test the hypotheses of this 
paper.
Presidential and Gubernatorial Elections in Mexico
Mexico has a fairly institutionalized party system for the 
average of the region (Mainwaring 2018)15 that presents 
puzzling findings when the literature has studied cam-
paign effects in presidential elections. As previously dis-
cussed, while in American presidential elections only a 
small proportion of the electorate changes its vote inten-
tion, at least a third of the electorate switch its declared 
vote intention in Mexican presidential campaigns (Greene, 
2011 and 2015). These findings are puzzling since Mexico 
has fairly strong parties and party labels, with high lev-
els of electoral stability in both presidential and legislative 
elections (Mainwaring, 2016). In fact, up until 2012, more 
than 80% of the vote share was captured by the three ma-
jor parties in Mexico: the Institutional Revolutionary Party 
(PRI), the National Action Party (PAN), and the Party of the 
Democratic Revolution (PRD). In addition, the Mexican par-
ty system has one of the highest rates of party identifica-
tion in Latin America at both the national and subnation-
al level,16 since two thirds of the electorate identify with a 
political party, and has remained stable since the begin-
15 In the 1990-2015 period, the Mexican system, along with Uruguay, the Domin-
ican Republic, and Chile, registered almost perfect stability in the main con-
tenders in Latin American presidential elections. When interparty electoral 
competition and stability of parties’ ideological positions are added, Uruguay, 
Mexico, and Chile constituted the most stable systems in Latin America (Main-
waring, 2018).
16 At the subnational level, Michoacán and Nuevo León report high levels of par-
ty identification according to the panel surveys: 50% and 60%, respectively, 
without considering leaners.
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ning of Mexico’s transition to democracy. Given this con-
text, theoretically we would expect fewer vote shifts than 
the literature has found.
The fact that an important proportion of the electorate 
satisfices during survey interviews, particularly at the be-
ginning of the campaign, can provide an answer to this 
puzzle. Table 2 presents the profile of voters who satisfice 
providing inconsistent answers, and those who provide 
consistent answers. Data from original panel surveys con-
ducted during the gubernatorial elections in Mexico in 2015 
allows us to identify the proportion of respondents who 
switch their vote choice at later stages of the campaign and 
partisanship levels. As previously advanced, voters who 
satisfice are significantly more likely to change their vote 
choice (e.g. among voters who satisfice, 57% change their 
vote choice throughout the campaigns). This behavior is ex-
plained because, according to the argument of this paper, 
some voters switch their initial vote choice as a function of 
their increased motivation to engage in a survey interview. 
The descriptive statistics also show that both voters who 
satisfice and voters who provide consistent answers have 
a considerable proportion of partisans (e.g. among voters 
who satisfice, 47% self-identify as partisans), which sug-
gests that satisficing is not exclusively a function of parti-
sanship. 
Table 2.  
Profile of Voters Who Satisfice and Don’t Satisfice
Voters who satisfice Voters who provide  consistent answers
Change vote choice 57% 28%
Partisans 47% 67%
Source: 2015 Gubernatorial Panel Survey. 
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Empirical Strategy and Data
In order to test for the satisficing effect, I rely on both cross-
sectional and panel data surveys. To test hypothesis 1, the 
analysis includes pooled data conducted throughout the 
2006 and 2012 presidential elections in Mexico (six and 
eight electoral polls17, respectively). For hypothesis 2, the 
analysis is based on a panel survey, which provides direct 
evidence of change by comparing the same respondents at 
different times. The 2006 and 2012 Mexico Panel Surveys 
(Lawson, Chappell et al., 2006 and 2013) only include one 
vote choice survey question, which makes it difficult to test 
respondents’ consistency. Instead, I rely on an original two-
wave telephone panel survey conducted during the 2015 
gubernatorial campaigns in two Mexican states.18 These 
panel surveys include two vote choice questions, which can 
allow identify which voters are satisficing.
As previously mentioned, respondents will be consid-
ered to satisfice if s/he provides inconsistent, contradicto-
ry answers to the vote choice questions included in the in-
terview. Hypothesis 1 proposes that voters will be able to 
connect the campaign “fundamentals” with vote choice, but 
this effect will be conditional on survey satisficing. In or-
der to test the conditional relationship, I based my analysis 
on respondent’s PARTY IDENTIFICATION19 and PRESIDENTIAL 
APPROVAL.20 In addition, Table A7 and A8 of the Appen-
17 BGC Beltrán, Juárez y Asocs., Mexican polling firm, conducted the 14 national 
electoral polls during the 2006 and 2012 presidential campaigns. Each sur-
vey had an average sample of 1,200 respondents (pooled data from 2006: 
N=7,200 and pooled data from 2012: N=10,200). 
18 BGC Beltrán, Juárez y Asocs. conducted the two telephone panel surveys in Mi-
choacán and Nuevo León. The first wave was conducted on March (N=1,600) 
and the second wave was conducted the week before election day (June 
2015). Table A5-A6 of the Appendix presents a detailed explanation of the at-
trition rate. First and second waves in both gubernatorial elections appear to 
be balanced in terms of demographic variables.
19 Regardless of which party you vote for, do you normally think of yourself as 
panista, priista or perredista or from any other political party? 
20 “Do you approve or disapprove the way (NAME PRESIDENT) is doing his job as 
President” (1=Approve; 0=Disapprove)
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dix also report results using a composite measure of vot-
ers’ POLITICAL PREDISPOSITIONS, which combines partisan 
strength21 and presidential approval.22
Hypothesis 2 proposes that survey satisficing represents 
a major predictor of respondents who change their vote 
choice, which is measured if the respondents changed their 
declared vote intention between the first and second wave 
of the panel survey (VOTE CHOICE CHANGE23). I also control 
for alternative hypotheses in order to exclude the possibil-
ity that other variables are driving the results. In addition 
to partisanship (partisan/independent), the analysis con-
trol for an additive index that measures if the respondents 
know the name of the major candidates competing in the 
election (NAME RECOGNITION24). The models also test the 
strength of respondents’ declared vote choice (VOTE CER-
TAINTY). To do that, I created an index to measure how cer-
tain the respondents are about their declared vote intention. 
In particular, I rely on the following question, which was 
asked for each major candidate competing in the election:
“Using a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means 
that it is not likely and 10 means very likely, how 
likely are you to vote for...(CANDIDATE NAME) so 
s/he can be the next governor of the state?”
For example, in the case of a respondent that declared a 
preference for the PAN, I calculated the difference between 
the self-reported likelihood of voting for the PAN and vot-
ing for the PRI. I also calculated the difference between the 
self-reported likelihood of voting for the PAN and voting for 
21 Based on the follow-up question for voters who declare party identification: 
How much (do you identify): Not much? A lot?
22 This index reduces measurement error and controls for potential survey satis-
ficing when respondents’ answer both the party identification and presiden-
tial approval questions. 
23 VOTE CHOICE CHANGE: 1=If vote choice change between the first wave and sec-
ond wave 0=No change. The analysis is based on the vote choice question that 
explicitly shows/refers who the major candidates competing in the election are.
24 I am going to read you a list of people. Before I mentioned their names, have 
you heard of (NAME)? 
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the PRD. I added those differences and rescaled the index 
between 0 (very uncertain) and 1 (very certain). I followed 
the same strategy for the likelihood of voting for the PRI and 
PRD candidate.
Vote Choice Certainty (PAN) = [ Pr (PAN) – Pr(PRI) 
] + [ (Pr (PAN) – Pr(PRD) ]
Vote Choice Certainty (PRI) = [ (Pr (PRI) – Pr(PAN) ] 
+ [ (Pr (PRI) – Pr(PRD) ]
Vote Choice Certainty (PRD) = [ (Pr (PRD) – Pr(PAN) 
] + [ (Pr (PRD) – Pr(PRI) ]
The analysis also includes several control variables that 
might affect the likelihood of voters switching their vote in-
tention throughout the campaign. I control for CAMPAIGN IN-
FORMATION to make sure that my results are not driven by 
voters’ exposure to campaign messages. This additive in-
dex is based on open-ended questions that asked the re-
spondent to correctly identify candidates’ policy proposals25 
and the campaign slogans of each major candidate.26 I also 
control for TV AD EXPOSURE,27 based on self-reported me-
dia exposure to TV ads, and an index of CAMPAIGN CONTACT 
measuring if the respondent has been contacted by a cam-
paign representative or by mail from each candidate run-
ning in the gubernatorial election. These additive indices 
range from 0 (low level) to 1 (high level). Finally, I also con-
trol for respondents’ POLITICAL INFORMATION based on three 
questions of general knowledge about the party system.28 29 
25 I will read some policy proposals that candidates have proposed in the cur-
rent campaign. Based on what you know or have heard, which candidate 
proposed to (PROPOSAL)?
26 Based on what you know or have heard, which candidate has the following 
campaign slogan? (SLOGAN)
27 Do you remember watching any campaign ad on TV of a political party in the 
last weeks? From which parties?
28 “What is the name of the current governor of the state (VOLUNTARY)?”, “How 
many chambers does the Mexican Congress has? (VOLUNTARY)?”, and “How 
many years does a deputy term last in Mexico? (VOLUNTARY)?”
29 SATISFICING, PARTISAN, NAME RECOGNITION, VOTE CERTAINTY, and POLITI-
CAL INFORMATION were measured in the first wave of the panel survey. While 
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Each model presented in this paper controls for socio-de-
mographic variables such as AGE, EDUCATION, and FEMALE 
to confirm that these variables are not driving the results.
Results
Hypothesis 1 proposes that voters who satisfice are less 
able to connect their political predispositions –the cam-
paign “fundamentals”– to their declared vote intention. Ta-
ble 3 displays results from a multinomial logistic regression 
based on pooled electoral data collected during the 2006 
and 2012 campaigns in Mexico. The dependent variable of 
each model is the declared vote choice (PAN, PRI, PRD) in 
which PAN is the base category since it was the incumbent 
party in both the 2006 and the 2012 electoral cycles. Hy-
pothesis 1 focuses on the moderating role that satisficing 
plays regarding the effect of the campaign fundamentals on 
vote choice (the bivariate relationship between SATISFICING 
and VOTE CHOICE is reported in Appendix A9 and A10). 
In order to assess the “satisficing” effect, there are two 
important things to take from the coefficient estimates of 
Table 3. The first interaction terms examine if the effect 
of PARTISANSHIP on VOTE CHOICE is conditional on survey 
satisficing. The second battery of interaction terms tests 
if the effect of PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL on VOTE CHOICE 
is moderated by survey satisficing. The results displayed 
in Table 3 confirm the first hypothesis of this paper: the 
effect of the campaign “fundamentals” on vote choice 
throughout the campaign in both the 2006 and the 2012 
presidential elections is moderated by survey satisficing. 
The signs are in the expected direction and have a p value 
that achieves statistical significance by any conventional 
threshold (p < .01).
CAMPAIGN INFORMATION, TV AD EXPOSURE, and CAMPAIGN CONTACT were 
measured in the second wave.
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Table 3.  
Conditional Effect of Survey Satisficing on the connection  
between Campaign “Fundamentals” and Vote Choice
Multinomial Logistic Regression
(Base Category DV = PAN)
2006 2012
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PRI PRD PRI PRD
Satisficing -0.47** -1.35*** -0.92*** -0.72***
(0.24) (0.21) (0.24) (0.25)
PAN -2.54*** -3.11*** -2.68*** -4.20***
(0.22) (0.16) (0.12) (0.25)
PAN X Satisficing 1.65*** 1.19*** 1.40*** 2.20***
(0.32) (0.31) (0.29) (0.47)
PRI 3.76*** 0.16 3.72*** -0.35
(0.18) (0.20) (0.17) (0.24)
PRI X Satisficing -1.13*** 0.12 -2.88*** -0.65
(0.30) (0.34) (0.30) (0.43)
PRD 0.30 3.94*** -0.12 4.48***
(0.50) (0.33) (0.41) (0.33)
PRD X Satisficing 1.07 -1.62*** 1.04 -2.90***
(0.67) (0.51) (0.64) (0.57)
Pres. Approval -1.97*** -2.16*** -1.60*** -1.96***
(0.17) (0.15) (0.11) (0.13)
Approval X Satisficing 0.82*** 1.12*** 1.32*** 1.06***
(0.26) (0.24) (0.26) (0.29)
Education -0.33*** -0.15*** -0.23*** -0.14***
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Age -0.02*** -0.00 -0.01* 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Female 0.08 -0.15 -0.18** -0.51***
(0.11) (0.09) (0.08) (0.10)
Constant 2.27*** 2.58*** 2.59*** 1.98***
(0.32) (0.28) (0.26) (0.30)
Observations 5,522 5,522 8,280 8,280
Pseudo R-sq 0.51 0.51 0.58 0.58
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3. The table displays results from a multinomial logit model. The 
dependent variable is categorical (PAN, PRI, PRD). The base category 
is PAN. The base category for PARTISANSHIP is Independent.
Source: Pooled data from 2006 and 2012 electoral polls.
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Figure 5 converts the logit coefficients for the models of the 
2012 presidential election into predicted probabilities of vot-
ing for the three major candidates across partisan groups. 
The black dots display the probability when the respondent 
provides consistent answers and the gray dots display the 
probability when the respondent satisfices. In these figures 
we see evidence that respondents who satisfice display a 
weaker connection between partisanship and vote be-
havior. For example, in the case of voting for the PAN, vot-
ers who self-identify with the PAN and provide consistent 
answers have an 84% probability of voting for that par-
ty, while voters who satisfice have a probability of 56%, 
a difference of 28 percentage points. The difference is 26 
and 42 percentage points in the case of voting for the PRI 
and PRD, respectively, among their partisan voters. In other 
words, satisficing weakens the connection between parti-
sanship and vote choice, making voters who satisfice more 
likely to declare support for an alternative that is inconsis-
tent with their partisanship.
Figure 5.  
Connection between Partisanship and Vote for the… (2012)  
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With regards to the second interactive terms (APPROVAL X 
SATISFICING), Figure 6 converts the logit coefficients for the 
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models of the 2012 presidential election into predicted pro-
babilities of voting for the three major parties while con-
trolling for partisanship. The satisficing effect is statistically 
significant and in the expected direction, although it tends 
to be less strong than that of partisanship. For example, vo-
ters who approve the incumbent PAN president and provide 
consistent answers have a 32% probability of voting for the 
PAN, while voters who satisfice have a probability of 26%, 
a difference of 6 percentage points. The difference is 8 and 
4 percentage points in the case of respondents who disap-
prove the incumbent and vote for the PRI and PRD. Ove-
rall, these models provide evidence that survey satisficing 
affects the impact that the campaign fundamentals exert on 
vote choice. 
Figure 6.  
Connection between Presidential Approval and Vote for the…
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Hypothesis 2 proposes that voters who satisfice at the be-
ginning of the campaign are more likely to change their 
vote preference, giving support to the notion that satisficing 
increases the proportion of respondents who changes their 
vote preference. Table 4 displays the results from logistic 
regressions based on an original panel survey conducted 
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during the gubernatorial campaigns in two Mexican states. 
The dependent variable is coded as 1 if there is any sub-
stantive change in respondent’s vote preference (e.g. shift 
from political party “A” to “B” between the first and sec-
ond wave). It does not include changes from non-response/
don’t know to a candidate preference (or viceversa). SAT-
ISFICING displays a positive relationship and has a p value 
that achieves statistical significance (p < .01). In fact, when 
PARTISAN is added to the model, considered by the litera-
ture as the most important predictor of vote choice stability, 
SATISFICING remains statistically significant. In other words, 
survey satisficing represents a strong predictor of voters’ 
likelihood to switch their candidate preference throughout 
the campaign.
SATISFICING also remains significant even when con-
trolling for candidates’ name recognition and vote intention 
strength. In the first case, knowledge about the name of the 
major candidates does not achieve statistical significance. 
However, as expected, the strength of respondents’ vote in-
tention does represent a strong predictor of switching vote 
preference throughout the campaign (p < .01). These find-
ings also confirm that SATISFICING is not a function of vot-
ers’ lack of political information or the certainty about their 
declared vote intention. In addition, the models also con-
trol for additional variables that might explain why voters 
switch their candidate preference. For example, voters who 
were directly contacted by campaigns –either by a candi-
date representative or by mail– are more likely to switch 
their vote. This is consistent with the voter mobilization lit-
erature that has found that direct appeals to voters tend to 
be consequential on voters’ preferences. In a similar way, 
voters with high levels of campaign information are less 
likely to switch their candidate preference, since they rein-
force their pre-campaign predispositions with the incoming 
information flow.
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Table 4. 
Change vote preference and Survey Satisficing
Logistic Regression
DV: 1 Change vote preference 0: No change
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Satisficing 0.71*** 0.69*** 0.47** 0.44** 0.42* 0.46**
(1st Wave) (0.18) (0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.22) (0.22)
0.23
Partisan (0.20) 0.22 0.23 0.18 0.23
0.69*** (0.20) (0.20) (0.21) (0.22)
Vote Choice Certainty -1.16*** -1.15*** -1.28*** -1.26***
(0.33) (0.33) (0.35) (0.35)
Candidates -0.25 -0.19 -0.17
(Name Recognition) (0.17) (0.18) (0.19)
Interest Campaign 0.14 0.12
(0.11) (0.11)
Campaign Info -0.85* -0.97**
(0.46) (0.47)
Campaign Contact 1.62*** 1.59***
(0.61) (0.61)
TV Ads Reception -0.22 -0.22
(0.41) (0.42)
Female -0.30
(0.20)
Age -0.01
(0.01)
Education 0.03
(0.05)
Constant 0.71*** -0.83*** -0.19 0.49 0.24 0.52
(0.18) (0.19) (0.26) (0.53) (0.58) (0.69)
Observations 528 471 471 471 466 466
Pseudo R-sq 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.07
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: 2015 Panel Survey conducted during Gubernatorial Campaigns.
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Finally, Figure 7 converts the logit coefficients of the 
sixth model into predicted probabilities of changing vote 
preference and highlights the substantive difference be-
tween SATISFICING and partisanship. For example, survey 
inconsistency is associated with a 0.15 (on scale ranging 
from 0 to 1) increase in the probability of changing vote 
choice throughout the campaign. In contrast, being PAR-
TISAN has a weak substantive effect (0.03) that fails to 
achieve statistical significance.
Figure 7. Probability of Switching Vote Intention
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Discussion
The findings of this paper are consistent with previous re-
search that highlights the uncertainty that characterizes the 
beginning of a political campaign (Gelman and King, 1993; 
Enns and Richman, 2013). From this perspective, political 
campaigns play a major role activating pre-campaigns un-
derlying predispositions allowing the voter to support the 
candidate in line with their political preferences. Nonethe-
less, this paper finds that much of the uncertainty in the ear-
ly stages of political campaigns is motivated by respondents’ 
survey-taking behavior. These findings are relevant to the 
campaigns literature because it means that the ability of 
some voters to base their vote choice on the fundamen-
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tals does not exclusively explain voters’ tendency to switch 
their vote intention throughout the campaign. Instead, vote 
intention shifts are also driven by voters’ levels of engage-
ment during a survey interview.
This paper offers an explanation to the question why 
elections in Latin America –particularly in Mexico– report 
a substantial proportion of voters who change their vote 
choice based on respondents’ survey taking behavior. Fu-
ture studies may consider alternative explanations, for ex-
ample, if the field date of the first wave of the panel sur-
vey affects the likelihood of respondents to satisfice. For 
instance, most comparative literature on campaign effects 
in Latin America has relied on the Mexico Panel Surveys. 
In the case of the 2006 presidential election, the first wave 
of the panel survey –that serves as the baseline to esti-
mate vote choice– was conducted during the second week 
of October when the nomination process had not finished 
yet (e.g. the primaries of the incumbent party (PAN) –and 
the eventual winner of the presidential election– did not 
finish until November of 2005). The presidential campaign, 
in fact, did not begin until January of 2006, which coin-
cides with the period in which the major news outlets be-
gan conducting national polls. Conducting the first wave of 
the panel survey before the actual campaign begins could 
have overestimated the proportion of voters who change 
their vote preference. As research on American politics sug-
gests, early polls have limited explanatory power since vot-
ers do not know much about the candidates and have not 
spent time thinking about them in an electoral context yet 
(Wlezien and Erikson, 2004).
In a similar way, future studies should also pay atten-
tion to the field date of the last wave of the panel survey. 
For example, the second and last wave of the 2012 Mexi-
co Panel Survey was conducted after election day. Previous 
studies have found that post-electoral studies tend to over-
estimate support for the candidate who won the election 
due to a bandwagon effect. In other words, voters tend to 
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align their vote choice to the winner regardless of whether 
they actually support that candidate. In order to minimize a 
potential bias that could affect voters’ response to the vote 
choice questions, future studies should consider conducting 
the last wave a few days before election day.
An implication of this paper is that studies in Latin 
American political behavior might be overestimating the in-
fluence of political campaigns on voting behavior since most 
studies have overlooked voters’ answer crystallization and 
consistency throughout a survey interview. This is problem-
atic because the baseline of most studies (e.g. panel surveys) 
–vote intention estimates at the beginning of the campaign– 
would be based on the analysis of respondents who are 
uninterested in the survey. In turn, the answers provided at 
a later stage of the campaign might not match their initial 
answer to the survey interview. This is why voters who sat-
isfice have a disproportionate likelihood of switching their 
vote choice through the campaign and gives the impression 
that campaigns are more consequential than they are. In-
stead, vote shifts are a function of voters’ increased motiva-
tion to engage in a survey interview.
Finally, the results reported in this paper may be conser-
vative. Although the Mexican party system does not reach 
the levels of stability that characterize other countries in 
the region, like Chile or Uruguay, it is a fairly institutional-
ized party system. If this study is replicated in a weakly in-
stitutionalized party system, voters may be even more like-
ly to satisfice since there are higher levels of uncertainty 
at the onset of the campaign since new parties tend to ap-
pear in each election cycle, party roots in society are weak, 
and parties are more delegitimized (Mainwaring and Scully, 
1999; Mainwaring, 2016). Voters’ engagement in survey in-
terviews may be lower since they are not familiar with the 
partisan options at the ballot, particularly at the beginning 
of a political campaign.
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Appendix 
Table A1.  
Vote Choice Questions – Complete Wording
Voluntary Structured
2006 Presidential 
Election
(Face-to-face)
Who would you prefer 
to be the next presi-
dent of the Republic? 
(VOLUNTARY)
Elections to elect the Presi-
dent of the Republic will be 
held in July. Which party or 
candidate would you vote for 
if elections were held today? 
(SHOW BALLOT)
2012 Presidential 
Election
(Face-to-face)
Who would you prefer 
to be the next presi-
dent of the Republic? 
(VOLUNTARY)
Elections to elect the Presi-
dent of the Republic will be 
held in July. Which party or 
candidate would you vote for 
if elections were held today? 
(SHOW BALLOT)
2015 Gubernatorial 
Election
(Telephone)
On June 7th elections 
to choose governor of 
the State will be held. 
If elections were held 
today, which candidate 
or political party would 
you vote for? (VOLUN-
TARY)
Between the following candi-
dates for governor: Candidate 
A of the Party A, Candidate B 
of the Party B and Candidate C 
of the Party C…Which candi-
date would you vote for?
Table A2.  
Respondents’ Vote Choice Consistency and Don’t Knows
Logistic Regression Models
DV: 1: Satisfice 0: Consistent
2006 2012
 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Don’t Knows (Low-High) 6.54*** 6.57*** 7.49*** 7.49***
(0.29) (0.29) (0.26) (0.26)
Age 0.00 -0.00*
(0.00) (0.00)
Female 0.19*** -0.07
(0.06) (0.07)
Education 0.05 -0.00
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(0.03) (0.04)
Constant -1.81*** -2.14*** -2.84*** -2.59***
(0.04) (0.17) (0.05) (0.21)
Observations 6,249 6,232 9,166 9,151
Pseudo R-squared 0.10 0.10 0.15 0.14
Source: Pooled data from 2006 and 2012 presidential electoral polls.
Table A3. Latent Variable
 Latent Variable (proxy of survey satisficing)
Conditional Effect of  Survey Satisficing on the connection
between Campaign “Fundamentals” and Vote Choice
Multinomial Logistic Regression (Base Category DV = PAN)
2006 2012
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PRI PRD PRI PRD
Latent Variable -0.86** -2.42*** -1.54*** -1.28***
(0.42) (0.38) (0.40) (0.42)
PAN -2.55*** -3.19*** -2.74*** -4.25***
(0.22) (0.17) (0.12) (0.26)
PAN X Latent 2.76*** 2.19*** 2.44*** 3.61***
(0.56) (0.56) (0.51) (0.85)
PRI 3.78*** 0.08 3.84*** -0.28
(0.19) (0.21) (0.18) (0.24)
PRI X Latent -1.82*** 0.51 -4.92*** -1.29*
(0.54) (0.61) (0.53) (0.76)
PRD 0.42 4.02*** -0.11 4.63***
(0.51) (0.35) (0.43) (0.34)
PRD X Latent 1.50 -3.02*** 1.60 -5.32***
(1.20) (0.95) (1.13) (1.04)
Pres. Approval -2.03*** -2.24*** -1.70*** -2.02***
(0.18) (0.16) (0.12) (0.13)
Approval X Latent 1.57*** 2.05*** 2.41*** 1.83***
(0.46) (0.43) (0.44) (0.50)
Education -0.02*** -0.00 -0.01* 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Age 0.07 -0.15 -0.19** -0.51***
(0.11) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10)
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Female -0.32*** -0.15*** -0.23*** -0.14***
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Constant 2.27*** 2.70*** 2.63*** 2.01***
(0.32) (0.28) (0.27) (0.31)
Observations 5,522 5,522 8,280 8,280
Pseudo R-sq 0.51 0.51 0.58 0.58
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A3. The table displays results from a multinomial logit model. 
The dependent variable is categorical (PAN, PRI, PRD). The base  
category is PAN. The base category for PARTISANSHIP is Independent.
Source: Pooled data from 2006 and 2012 electoral polls.
Table A4. Latent Variable
Latent Variable (proxy of survey satisficing)
Vote Choice and Survey Satisficing
Logistic regression
DV: 1 Change vote preference 0: No change
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
      
Latent 1.29*** 1.23*** 0.91** 0.84** 0.78* 0.88**
(Satisficing) (0.30) (0.33) (0.40) (0.40) (0.41) (0.42)
Partisan 0.01 0.22 0.22 0.18 0.23
(0.17) (0.20) (0.20) (0.21) (0.22)
Vote Certainty -1.16*** -1.15*** -1.29*** -1.27***
(0.33) (0.33) (0.35) (0.35)
Candidates -0.24 -0.18 -0.16
(Name Recognition) (0.17) (0.18) (0.19)
Interest Campaign 0.14 0.12
(0.11) (0.11)
Campaign Info -0.83* -0.95**
(0.46) (0.47)
Campaign Contact 1.62*** 1.58***
(0.61) (0.61)
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TV Ads Reception -0.21 -0.22
(0.41) (0.42)
Female -0.31
(0.20)
Age -0.01
(0.01)
Education 0.03
(0.05)
Constant 1.29*** 1.23*** 0.91** 0.84** 0.78* 0.88**
(0.30) (0.33) (0.40) (0.40) (0.41) (0.42)
Observations 676 591 471 471 466 466
Pseudo R-sq 0.02 0.2 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.07
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A4. The table displays results from a logit model. 
The dependent variable is a dichotomous measure that takes on the value of 1 
if the respondent changes vote choice and 0 if otherwise. 
Source: 2015 Panel Survey conducted during Gubernatorial Campaigns.
Table A5.  
Attrition rate in second wave
Second wave interview status Michoacán Nuevo León
Complete interview 39% 45%
Incomplete interview 2% 2%
Made an appointment but did not answer 22% 22%
Respondent does not live in that house anymore 11% 9%
Did not answer the phone 10% 8%
Telephone out of service 4% 5%
Did not accept the second interview 2% 3%
Did not accept a second interview (since first wave) 7% 3%
Answer machine 1% 2%
Telephone - Busy 2% 1%
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Table A6.  
Demographic variables (Wave 1 and Wave 2)
Michoacán Nuevo León
Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 1 Wave 2
Female 50% 54% 51% 55%
Age
18-25 11% 8% 11% 9%
26-40 20% 18% 18% 16%
41-60 46% 48% 40% 43%
61+ 23% 25% 32% 42%
Income (minimum wage)
0 - 1 MW 8% 5% 4% 3%
1 - 3 MW 26% 24% 20% 18%
3 - 5 MW 13% 15% 11% 12%
5 - 7 MW 3% 6% 4% 3%
7 - 10 MW 10% 8% 10% 13%
10+ MW 5% 6% 14% 14%
Education
None 13% 13% 9% 9%
Elementary 16% 15% 13% 13%
Secondary 19% 21% 19% 23%
High School 24% 23% 24% 24%
College 28% 28% 36% 32%
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Table A7. Composite Score of Political Predispositions
Conditional Effect of Satisficing on the connection
between Campaign “Fundamentals” (Composite Score 0-100) 
and Vote Choice
Multinomial Logistic Regression
2006 Presidential Campaign
Base=PAN Base=PRI Base=PRD
PRI PRD PAN PRD PAN PRI
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
       
Satisficing -1.10*** -1.83*** -0.55*** -0.65*** 0.07 0.42*
(0.27) (0.23) (0.20) (0.19) (0.18) (0.23)
PAN (0-100) -6.10*** -6.77***
(0.34) (0.28)
PAN (0-100) X 
Satisficing 3.36*** 3.12***
(0.49) (0.44)
PRI (0-100) -7.76*** -3.35***
(0.35) (0.20)
PRI (0-100) X 
Satisficing 3.51*** 1.41***
(0.51) (0.37)
PRD (0-100) -7.16*** -2.96***
(0.37) (0.30)
PRD (0-100) X 
Satisficing 3.50*** 2.43***
(0.56) (0.50)
Education -0.32*** -0.15*** 0.48*** 0.32*** 0.23*** -0.07
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
Female 0.02 -0.09 -0.16 -0.29*** 0.07 0.03
(0.13) (0.10) (0.11) (0.09) (0.11) (0.13)
Age -0.02*** -0.00 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.00 -0.02***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 3.28*** 3.49*** -0.25 -0.12 -0.03 0.11
(0.38) (0.31) (0.30) (0.25) (0.29) (0.34)
Observations 3,115 3,115 3,059 3,059 2,781 2,781
Pseudo  
R-squared 0.27 0.27 0.19 0.19 0.23 0.23
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Table A8.  
Composite Score of Political Predispositions
Multinomial Logistic Regression
2012 Presidential Campaign
Base=PAN Base=PRI Base=PRD
PRI PRD PAN PRD PAN PRI
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
       
Satisficing -1.35*** -1.23*** -0.77*** -0.33 -0.70*** -0.19
(0.27) (0.28) (0.21) (0.22) (0.26) (0.24)
PAN (0-100) -5.47*** -6.93***
(0.21) (0.26)
PAN (0-100) X Satisficing 3.74*** 3.65***
(0.47) (0.57)
PRI (0-100) -6.56*** -3.00***
(0.25) (0.17)
PRI (0-100) X Satisficing 4.96*** 2.59***
(0.51) (0.45)
PRD (0-100) -7.04*** -4.04***
(0.29) (0.19)
PRD (0-100) X Satisficing 3.94*** 2.10***
(0.65) (0.50)
Education -0.27*** -0.18*** 0.25*** 0.12*** 0.20*** -0.06
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Female -0.15* -0.54*** 0.23** -0.28*** 0.55*** 0.32***
(0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.08) (0.11) (0.09)
Age -0.01** 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 3.46*** 2.97*** -0.42 -0.60** 0.65** 1.73***
(0.29) (0.33) (0.28) (0.25) (0.32) (0.27)
Observations 3,939 3,939 5,331 5,331 3,562 3,562
Pseudo R-squared 0.24 0.24 0.18 0.18 0.20 0.20
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Table A9.  
Conditional Effect of Satisficing on the connection
between Campaign “Fundamentals” and Vote Choice
Multinomial Logistic Regression(Base Category DV = PAN)
2006 Presidential Campaign 
PRI PRD PRI PRD PRI PRD
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
       
Satisficing 0.27*** -0.34*** 0.28** -0.37*** -0.47** -1.35***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.12) (0.11) (0.24) (0.21)
PAN -1.94*** -2.86*** -2.54*** -3.11***
(0.15) (0.14) (0.22) (0.16)
PAN X Satisficing 1.65*** 1.19***
(0.32) (0.31)
PRI 3.47*** 0.13 3.76*** 0.16
(0.15) (0.16) (0.18) (0.20)
PRI X Satisficing -1.13*** 0.12
(0.30) (0.34)
PRD 0.99*** 3.54*** 0.30 3.94***
(0.32) (0.25) (0.50) (0.33)
PRD X Satisficing 1.07 -1.62***
(0.67) (0.51)
Pres. Approval -1.63*** -1.77*** -1.97*** -2.16***
(0.13) (0.11) (0.17) (0.15)
Approval X Satisficing 0.82*** 1.12***
(0.26) (0.24)
Education -0.33*** -0.16*** -0.33*** -0.15***
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Age -0.02*** -0.00 -0.02*** -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Female 0.08 -0.15 0.08 -0.15
(0.11) (0.09) (0.11) (0.09)
Constant -0.34*** 0.07** 2.01*** 2.26*** 2.27*** 2.58***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.30) (0.26) (0.32) (0.28)
Observations 5,764 5,764 5,522 5,522 5,522 5,522
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Pseudo R-squared 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.51 0.51
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A9. The table displays results from a multinomial logit model. The dependent 
variable is categorical (PAN, PRI, PRD). The base category is PAN. The base category for 
PARTISANSHIP is Independent. 
Source: Pooled data from 2006 electoral polls.
Table A10.  
Conditional Effect of Satisficing on the connection
between Campaign “Fundamentals” and Vote Choice
Multinomial Logistic Regression (Base Category DV = PAN)
2012 Presidential Campaign
PRI PRD PRI PRD PRI PRD
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
       
Satisficing -0.17* -0.08 0.03 -0.08 -0.92*** -0.72***
(0.09) (0.11) (0.14) (0.16) (0.24) (0.25)
PAN -2.49*** -3.82*** -2.68*** -4.20***
(0.10) (0.21) (0.12) (0.25)
PAN X Satisfi-
cing 1.40*** 2.20***
(0.29) (0.47)
PRI 3.20*** -0.61*** 3.72*** -0.35
(0.13) (0.19) (0.17) (0.24)
PRI X Satisficing -2.88*** -0.65
(0.30) (0.43)
PRD 0.37 4.03*** -0.12 4.48***
(0.30) (0.26) (0.41) (0.33)
PRD X Satisfi-
cing 1.04 -2.90***
(0.64) (0.57)
Pres. Approval -1.39*** -1.76*** -1.60*** -1.96***
(0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13)
Approval X  
Satisficing 1.32*** 1.06***
(0.26) (0.29)
Education -0.23*** -0.15*** -0.23*** -0.14***
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(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Age -0.01** 0.00 -0.01* 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Female -0.19** -0.51*** -0.18** -0.51***
(0.08) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10)
Constant 0.63*** -0.10*** 2.48*** 1.89*** 2.59*** 1.98***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.26) (0.30) (0.26) (0.30)
Observations 8,563 8,563 8,280 8,280 8,280 8,280
Pseudo  
R-squared 0.00 0.00 0.56 0.56 0.58 0.58
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A10. The table displays results from a multinomial logit model. The dependent 
variable is categorical (PAN, PRI, PRD). The base category is PAN. The base category for 
PARTISANSHIP is Independent.
Source: Pooled data from 2012 electoral polls.
